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The OHS effect of worker participation
Summary
In 1996, the Dutch government launched a 'reorientation' of its occupational health
& safety (OHS) policy and of the Working Conditions Act. This reorientation aimed
to decentralise OHS policy from state regulation to self regulation at a company
level. The main assumption in this strategy was that increased latitude at a compa-
ny level would enhance OHS initiatives on the part of employers. The shift towards
a company level, however, also entailed greater emphasis on worker participation
as a form of countervailing power. According to government: "Mobilisation of the
expertise of employees is an important prerequisite for good OHS policy. Active
involvement of employees is a qualitative stimulus and also secures a balance
between the interests of employers and employees." In the Dutch setting, 'worker
participation' in OHS policy mainly implied the involvement of works councils.
The government contended that the increased importance of worker participation
did not imply that the position of the works council needed to be strengthened in
relation to OHS. "In general, the position of the works council in both the Works
Councils Act and the Working Conditions Act may be deemed adequate."
This PhD thesis examines some of the above assumptions. The two main questions
are:
1. Does worker participation, especially by works councils, lead to better working
conditions?
2. Are works councils indeed sufficiently equipped to successfully fulfil their
assigned role in the field of occupational health & safety (OHS)?
A third, more implicit research question is
3. Does 5?/f regu/aft'on lead to better working conditions?
r 2,)
The regulation of occupational health & safety (OHS) has come a long way since
the end of the 19 th century. Until 1874, no legislation whatsoever existed in this
field. The protection of health & safety was deemed a joint responsibility of the
employer and the workers. In 1874, however, the first piece of legislation was
issued, mainly aimed at protecting women and children - the so-called /vrv/wiae
/m«raW/*.T. Working men. according to the then dominant market-liberal ideology,
did not require protection by the state. They were considered to aptly fend for them-
selves. This ideology, however, contrasted sharply with the harsh reality at a shop-
floor level. Most employers did not assume their responsibility, and the workers did
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not have the power to enforce protection. Mainly due to the weak position of the
Dutch trade unions, it was not until 1919 that male workers were brought under the
protection of state issued regulations (mainly in the field of working hours). The
1919 Labour Act meant a breakthrough in principle, stating for the first time that
a// workers had a statutory right to decent work. After this breakthrough, an
ongoing stream of state regulations were issued in the field of OHS, regulations
enforceable by public authority (Labour Inspectorate).
Since the 1970s though, doubt has been cast as to the effectiveness of state regula-
tion. This resulted in a paradigm shift in OHS policy, away from so-called 'com-
mand and control' interventionism towards self regulation. A landmark in this shift
was a report published by the Robens Committee (1972), stating that "the primary
responsibility lies with those who create the risk[s] and those who work with them
|...| There is a role for government action, but [that] role should be predominantly
concerned with influencing attitudes and creating a framework for better health and
safety organisation and action by industry itself." This theoretical framework was
embodied in the UK 'Health & Safety at Work Act' (1974) and also echoed in the
Dutch Working Conditions Act (WCA, 1980). Both pieces of legislation imposed a
general duty of care upon employers, and also a duty to outline an OHS policy.
Furthermore, the Dutch WCA bestowed a right of co-determination upon the
workers (notably the works council).
Despite some amendments in the WCA since 1980 (such as an obligation to carry
out a risk assessment and the introduction of OHS Services in 1994), this frame-
work of a general duty of care on the employer's side and co-determination on the
other side still holds at the end of the 20 th century. Both parties are believed to
jointly develop a policy to protect health & safety at work. This may appear to be
a return to the pre-1874 period, in which the protection of health & safety was also
considered a matter of free deliberation between employer and employees. There is
a clear distinction between these two periods, however, as the workers (notably the
works councils) are presently much better equipped with legal rights - mainly on
the basis of the Works Councils Act.
.v/fl/wforv po.w'fiVw o/woribs cownr/'As (CTiapter 3)
The first version of the Works Councils Act (1950) hardly addressed the field of
health & safety. The works council only had the task of monitoring company com-
pliance with all legal OHS standards. In 1971, this supervisory task was trans-
formed into the task to 'stimulate' compliance. More importantly, the 1971 Works
Councils Act bestowed a right of approval upon the works council in matters con-
cerning OHS as well as advisory powers concerning various topics of a more stra-
tegic character. The scope of such powers was broadened gradually in subsequent
versions of the Works Councils Act. The 1980 Working Conditions Act and its
amendments in 1994 and 1998 fleshed out the more general framework laid down
in the Works Councils Act.
At the end of the 1990s, the range of statutory powers enjoyed by works councils
in the field of OHS was actually quite broad:
- a consultative right in general and specific consultative rights in the field of OHS:
- a general right to information in all fields and specific rights in the field of OHS:
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a general right to make proposals;
various facilities, such as time off work and a right to specific training;
a right to set up an OHS commission;
legal protection against specific negative consequence (notably dismissal);
a right of approval concerning specific rulings in the field of OHS (such as a con-
tract with an OHS service);
advisory powers pertaining to economic and strategic policy, that may also serve
to mitigate the (negative) OHS side effects of these policies;
a right to consult the Labour Inspectorate.
But. even if works councils are well endowed with statutory powers, they seldom
succeed in applying them effectively in practice. The most basic rights - to be con-
sulted and informed - are observed properly: in 86% of all companies, the works
council is consulted regularly and, in 82%, the flow of information may be labelled
'adequate'. Still, over 10% of all works councils are denied even these most basic
rights (adding here that some 15% of all 50+ companies have not installed a works
council at all). The most noteworthy right in the field of OHS - the right of appro-
val - is violated more often than not. Only in 37% of the companies, is the right of
approval fully respected. In 39% of the companies, the works council is systemati-
cally bypassed. Moreover, analysis shows that most works councils do not even
notice that their rights in this field are being violated and, if they do, they seldom
stand up to the employer.
In general, the performance of works councils lacks vigour. Over a period of two
years, only one in eight exercised the right to submit proposals. One of the main
explanations is that no less than 92% of the respondents in the survey state that the
works council is overburdened and lacks sufficient time (61%). Also, many works
councils lack specific expertise in the field of OHS (and the level of expertise has
not risen in comparison to a 1986 survey among works councils). Finally, some
50% of all works councils hardly ever have contact with the Labour Inspectorate.
The labour inspectors themselves are not positive about the performance of works
councils either: only some 60% of all works councils are deemed to be know-
ledgeable (no more than 10% perform 'well'). Nonetheless, 46% of all responding
inspectors generally see the works council as a useful partner. Only 11% of all
inspectors state that the works council does not contribute to OHS at all.
Analysing the background factors that may be of significant influence on the per-
formance of the works council, three factors come to the fore. First, works councils
that are prepared to take a more active stance appear to be taken more seriously by
their employer - they are less likely to be bypassed and they receive better infor-
mation. The same holds for works councils that maintain relatively close contact
with trade unions. However, these more syndicalist types of works councils only
constitute a small minority. Second, co-determination by works councils is clearly
more effective in larger firms. This does not relate primarily to the qualities of the
larger works councils themselves (they are no less overburdened than smaller ones),
but it is clear that in larger firms consultative policy making is more developed than
in smaller enterprises. The third and most salient conclusion is that the effective-
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ness of worker participation in OHS is very much dependent on management style
and the employers attitude towards co-determination. If the employer is sceptical or
even condescending about co-determination, the works council will achieve little.
This last, not altogether surprising, conclusion raises a question of a more funda-
mental nature: if worker participation is thought to strengthen OHS policy and the-
reby contribute towards the protection of health & safety at work (even though in
some companies worker participation does not get off the ground), this implies that
in the latter case health & safety may be more at risk - resulting in inequality in the
protection of fundamental human rights. Therefore, experiments in the area of self
regulation may be at loggerheads with fundamental principles of the constitutional
order. The answer to this question, however, is to be postponed until it has esta-
blished whether or not worker participation does indeed lead to better working con-
ditions.
O//S tfjott/ »/warier parfjt-ipaf/on (Ouster 5)
Since 1998, the Dutch Labour Inspectorate has carried out an annual OHS Monitor
involving some I.MX) companies in order to assess the current state of OHS and
OHS policy in the Netherlands in general. On the basis of a secondary analysis of
the 2(X) I findings, it has been possible to estimate the effect of worker participation
(by works councils) on matters related to OHS. The qualitv of OHS mav be onera-
tionalised by means of various indicators, such as:
1. The quality of OHS policy (risk assessment, plans of action, contract with an
OHS service);
2. Actual working conditions (physical and mental burden, repetitive strain in-
juries, noise, dangerous substances);
3. The negative effects of poor working conditions (absenteeism, incapacity for
work, occupational accidents).
The findings of the OHS Monitor indicate that there is a clear connection between
the presence of a works council on the one hand and the presence and quality of
both a risk assessment and u plan of action on the other hand. One in five companies
(50+ employees) without a works council, has also failed to carry out a risk asses-
sment. In companies that do have a works council - this is more than 6% - per-
taining to the presence of a plan of action, the difference is not significant. Plans of
action that have not been discussed with the works council, however, are of a
significantly poorer quality (according to the inspectors). Also the quality of both
OHS instruments increases with the frequency of consultation and the influence of
the works council. OHS services also appear to benefit from the influence of the
works council. The scope of the contract with the OHS service is significantly more
encompassing in companies with a works council than in their counterparts without
worker representation. Also, the focus is more on preventive activities than merely
absenteeism. Findings from another survey also indicate that the im/wcf of OHS
services is stronger in companies in which the works council had been involved in
contracting the OHS service.
Regarding the actual working conditions, the presence of a works council seems to
be beneficial. The mere presence of a works council does not, obviously, have a
great impact on the presence of OHS risks. These go hand in hand with the nature
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of production. Companies in which OHS is a recurrent theme of consultation,
however, have significantly more often taken measures to reduce the risks (93'*)
than companies that hardly ever discuss OHS matters with the works council
(78%). Also, the measures are embedded more thoroughly in the former companies
(84%) than in the latter (49%).
A third indicator of the positive effect of worker participation may be that compa-
nies in which the works council has not been involved in the process of contracting
an OHS service, absenteeism is at a higher level. Absenteeism appears to correlate
significantly with the type of OHS policy, and the works council may to some
extent influence the type of policy of both the OHS service and of the employer.
o/in/7u?nr?
It can therefore be concluded that both the presence and involvement of works
councils have a positive effect on OHS in companies. In order to acquire a better
picture of the precise nature of the influence of the works council, case studies were
carried out in two contrasting branches - the construction industry and the financial
services sector (banks and insurance companies). The findings of these case studies
do not provide cause for great enthusiasm. Works councils show little initiative,
they mainly respond to policy proposals of the employer or OHS staff. Their exper-
tise is meagre, with respect to both the field of OHS and the ability to operate at a
policy level. On close examination though, they play a valuable role in pointing out
shop floor risks and communicating daily experiences to OHS staff and manage-
ment. Also, some of the OHS experts stated that in their own policy they anticipate
possible reactions of the works council.
7)
On balance, it is beyond dispute that the involvement of works councils in the field
of OHS does indeed has a positive effect - albeit marginal, especially in companies
that already have established a professional OHS infrastructure (notably in the form
of an OHS coordinator). In many companies, however, doubt may be cast as to the
effectiveness of worker participation. In the concluding chapter, some ideas are put
forward to strengthen the protection of health & safety at work. These ideas seek to
address some of the weaknesses in the current system, mainly the lack of time and
expertise on the part of worker representatives. The main idea is that all companies
of, say, over 20 workers should be obliged to organise some sort of expertise in the
form of internal OHS services or safety experts. Well-trained professionals at a
shop floor level may be expected to boost both attention for OHS matters and effec-
tiveness in terms of OHS policy. On the other hand, OHS should not, in my opi-
nion, be left exclusively to the professionals. Professionalism does present the risk
of one-sidedness, of an OHS policy in which the .v/iry> yfrwr c*/>f nVmr drifts
beyond the horizon. Therefore, an active role must still be allotted to worker repre-
sentatives. This role, it is argued, should not primarily be staged at a policy level
but rather at a shop floor level. 'Invisible' OHS risks such as stress, organisational
culture, and so on may best be brought to the surface by those who arc trusted by
their co-workers. Hence, a more active role should be played in the process of risk
assessment to ensure that non-expert experience is properly included.
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